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Abstract 
Australia is the great multicultural experiment with around 26% of the 
population having been born overseas. But multiculturalism in Australia 
remains controversial. Whilst some see cultural diversity as an asset and 
cite the existence of a relatively harmonious society, others point to the 
existence of ethnic ghettoes and inter-racial tension. The occasional race 
riots, typically centered in the inner suburbs of Sydney, are said to be 
symptomatic of this unease. 
Irrespective, multiculturalism has become an embedded part of the fabric of 
Australia and there is no turning back for the country and its institutions. 
One area where the more pluralistic society has caused a rethink in core 
values is in the legal system. Whilst the law remains steadfastly routed in 
its British christian common law traditions the influence of other cultures 
and beliefs is emerging. The primary two instances of this have seen the 
partial accommodation of indigenous customary law and traditions and the 
debate over the accommodation of Islamic law principles.  
The adoption of “foreign” legal concepts goes to the heart of what it means 
to be a liberal democratic society: does it mean wholesale legal plurality or 
are there some “foreign” legal principles that are an anathema to a free and 
equal society? Putting it in the Australian context: should Australia facilitate 
the recognition by minorities of their customary and religious laws or is 
multiculturalism about establishing the one legal framework that applies to 
all equally and without discrimination? 
This paper will explore these developments and seek to identify the future 
implications for the legal system of an increasingly multicultural Australia. It 
will be observed that legal plurality does exist in Australia but largely in the 
shadows of the official legal system. There have been limited attempts to 
render the official realm more sensitive to indigenous beliefs and customs, 
with the creation in most States of indigenous courts the most significance 
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development. How successful this initiative has been is yet to be 
determined. Meanwhile the absence of official recognition and supervision 
of faith based tribunals, whether Christian, Jewish or Muslim, has resulted 
in vulnerable people not enjoying the protections afforded in the official 
realm.  It is the author’s view that whatever form legal plurality takes first 




One Law for all: multiculturalism and legal 
plurality in Australia 
“There is one law we are all expected to abide by. It is the law enacted by the Parliament under the 
Australian Constitution. If you can’t accept that then you don’t accept the fundamentals of what Australia 
is and what it stands for.” 
Peter Costello, “Worth promoting, worth defending. Australian citizenship. What it means and how to 
nurture it.’, Address to the Sydney Institute, 23 February 2006. 
 
Multiculturalism’s dilemmas 
Multiculturalism has always been a controversial proposition. Although at 
least one notable world leader has labeled it a failure,1 for many countries, 
such as Australia, there can be no turning back. 
The inherent concern for a multicultural society is whether it will fragment 
as a result of the recognition and accommodation of differences being 
inconsistent with basic secular liberal-democratic principles of equality, 
stability and neutrality.2 This focuses attention on exactly how these 
principles are to apply in practice. In particular, should a secular society 
allow, and even actively accommodate, all religions and practices or rather 
forbid those which are perceived to impinge on the freedoms of its citizens? 
Does by secular do we mean that all religions and practices must be 
allowed to flourish equally or that none may be entertained that impinge on 
fundamental civil and human rights? Putting the question yet another way, 
should a multicultural society mandate equal rights for all citizens or should 
it be prepared to permit, and even endorse, the right of some (possibly 
coerced and vulnerable) citizens to curtail their fundamental rights in the 
pursuit of cultural and religious expression? 
1 Matthew Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has ‘utterly failed’”, The Guradian 17 
October 2010 available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-
multiculturalism-failed (last visited 21 March 2014). 
2 Omid Payrow Shabani, “Introduction: The practice of law-making and the problem of difference” in 
Multiculturalism and law a critical debate, University of Wales Press. The phrase “militant democracy” has 
been invoked to describe the push back by democracies against forces that are seen as inconsistent with 
democratic principles and secularism: see  “The topography of Sharia in the Western political landscape” 





                                                          
 
Western democracies, in particular, are struggling with these dilemmas. 
Australia is no exception. 
 
Australia’s experiment 
Australia’s transformation from a “nervous white nation” to one of the most 
multicultural societies on Earth in less than 50 years is truly remarkable. 
The statistics paint the picture: 
• as at 1947 less than 1% of the population were non-European,3 
 
• over 6.5 million immigrants since World War II accounting for half the 
population growth, 
 
• around 25.6% of Australians were born overseas, 
 
• immigrants to local born ratio 2nd highest in the world, 
 
• over 200 languages spoken.4 
This transformation has not been without controversy and, indeed, the 
success or otherwise of the experiment is yet to be determined. Some 
racial ghettoes do exist as opponents are quick to point out.5 Furthermore, 
there has been racial conflict in the form of riots and ethnic gang activity.6 
Concerns as to the limits of the size of the population that the country can 
3 Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1947  available at 
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/12E0F80677C9A71ACA25784100197F2E/$File/1947
%20Census%20-%20Volume%20I%20-%20Part%20XII%20Birthplace.pdf 
4 Drawn from About Australia People, culture and lifestyle, Australian Government Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/people_culture.html and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_to_Australia (both last visited 7 March 2014). 
5 For a discussion as to the extent and history of ethnic concentrations see James Jupp, “Ethnic and 
Cultural Diversity in Australia”, Year Book Australia 1995 available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article41995?opendocum
ent&tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=1995&num&view (last visited 7 March 2014). 
6 Epitomized by the 2005 Cronulla riots covered by the ABC in a mini-documentary at 
http://www.abc.net.au/archives/80days/stories/2012/01/19/3412161.htm (last visited 7 March 2014). 
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sustain in terms of the environment and infrastructure have also added 
weight to calls for a reconsideration of the immigration policy.7 
The Australian experience has been a centrally planned immigration policy, 
a point that is asserted to contrast the approach in Europe.8 Generally 
premised on the concept of “populate or perish” (or more specifically “be 
taken over by some other nation”), the immigration policy has taken many 
forms, from the early convict fleets, black birding and indentured laborers,9 
assisted passages10 and the displaced persons program,11 to the current 
skills, family and humanitarian program.12 Underlying the different bases of 
admission has been a concern with race.  Whilst all races were generally 
welcomed prior to federation in 1901, the first acts of the new country were 
to enshrine the infamous white Australia policy.13 Although the definition of 
“whiteness” waned over time there remained essentially a Euro-centric 
immigration policy until the early 1970s. From that period there has been a 
progressive shift towards Asian immigration with a policy of promoting 
Australia as essentially Asian now predominant.14 
The deft hand of government has not ended with the entry of these 
immigrants. There has been a distinct policy to shape multicultural 
7 The arguments for and against a “big Australia” are neatly summarized in Jessica Brown and William 
Bourke, “Should Australia’s population be controlled?”, Sunday Herald Sun (2 October 2011) at 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/opinion/should-australias-population-be-controlled/story-e6frfhqf-
1226155091822 (last visited 7 March 2014). 
8 Ethnic diversity is not the same thing as having a multicultural policy:  Joint Standing Committee on 
Migration, Inquiry into Migration and Multiculturalism in Australia 2013 at paragraph 4.59 available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=m
ig/multiculturalism/report.htm (last visited 20 March 2014). 
9 See the ABC mini-documentary at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-14/an-blackbirding-
special/4887692 (last visited 7 March 2014). 
10 See http://www.migrationheritage.nsw.gov.au/belongings-home/about-belongings/australias-migration-
history/ (last visited 7 March 2014). 
11 Discussed at http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2009-10/html/65-years-of-nation-
building/Immigration-history-1945-1955.htm (last visited 7 March 2014). 
12 Detailed in the Australian Government fact sheet available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-
sheets/ (last visited 7 March 2014). 
13 Immigration Restriction Act 1901 
14 As expressed in the Australian Government White Paper of October 2012 Australia in the Asian 
Century available at http://www.asiaeducation.edu.au/verve/_resources/australia-in-the-asian-century-
white-paper.pdf. It is not clear whether the Abbott Government shares the view of the former Government 
as to the importance of Asia for Australia’s future: see Brendan Nicholson, “Asian century plans 
consigned to history”, The Australian (28 October 2013) available at 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/asian-century-plans-consigned-to-history/story-
e6frg8yo-1226747866681# (last visited 7 March 2014). 
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Australia.15 One manifestation of this policy has been the provision of multi-
lingual government services and anti-discrimination legislation. At the same 
time, concerns as to the possibility of Australian society fragmenting into a 
cluster of tribes has seen emphasis on national cohesion. Initially 
immigrants were expected to “assimilate” but this begged the question as 
to what were the core values of the society that they were expected to 
embrace and could they influence them? A more enlightened policy saw 
the rhetoric change to one of “integration”,16 although the expectation of an 
overriding and unifying commitment to Australia and its society and to 
accept the rights of others has seen the phrase coined “Australian 
multiculturalism”. Certainly the government sees diversity as a resource17 
and, whatever it heralds, multiculturalism is here to stay. However the 
concerns to maintain national cohesion have never been far away with 
government organized events to promote patriotism highly visible, 
especially on national celebratory days such as Australia Day and ANZAC 
Day. More recently a new “Harmony Day” (21 March) has been added to 
the national calendar. 
There is no question that the impact of the immigration policy has 
massively shaped Australian culture. For many of the first white immigrants 
of the 1780s Australia was a chance to start a culture afresh. For others 
though it was seen as a chance to craft the perfect white nation that was 
waning in the motherland. Over time the later view took dominance as the 
newsreels of much of the 1900s, with their fresh white faces overlaid with a 
very British commentary, attest to. However the lack of embedded 
traditions and the obvious inappropriateness of English customs for such 
an alien environment ensured that Australia was a sponge ready to absorb 
and embrace new ideas.18 As the British Empire waned Australia became 
to appreciate the need to be self-reliant and, ultimately, that it could not 
15 Admittedly less so during periods of a conservative government. 
16 Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants, Migrant Services and Programs, Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1978 (“Galbally Report”) available at 
www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/doc/galbally_1.pdf  
17 Australian Government (Office of Multicultural Affairs), National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, 
Canberra, July 1989, available at www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/pdf/na-multicultural-australia-
sharing-our-future.pdf  
18 Thus, multiculturalism may be more amenable to settler nations than those with established traditions 
borne from long occupation, such as Japan. 
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survive as an isolated Anglo and later Euro-centric enclave in an Asian 
world. The doors opened to a different type of immigrant with their different 
ideas. 
Day to day life in this multicultural land allows one to be a citizen of the 
world without leaving home. All end of restaurants, shops, clubs and 
cultural events abound. The ethnic mix is now simply part of the fabric of 
the society taken for granted and accepted as the norm. 
But what about the effect of multiculturalism on the country’s institutions? In 
particular, what influence, if any, has multiculturalism had on the law? As 
the nations of the world have become more integrated and populations 
have mingled a move towards pluralistic rather than mono-cultural legal 
systems has been increasingly debated.19 So to what extent is the 
Australian legal system pluralistic? 
 
Knights in armor clanking their medieval chains in a world of gum 
trees, koalas and aborigines 
Naturally as part of the British Empire the Australian colonies embraced 
English legal traditions and English law. The notion that Australia had been 
empty land that had been “settled” not only permitted British sovereignty 
but meant that English laws applied.20 Whilst there was some innovation, 
both courts and the early parliaments took their lead almost exclusively 
from the motherland.21 With the Act of Federation (itself British legislation22) 
all the laws of England were assumed into Australia. 
19 For example, see Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869; Peter 
Sack and Elizabeth Minchin (eds), Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII 
(ANU, Canberra, 1986); John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1; 
Gordon Woodman, “Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice” (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 152; 
Jennifer Corrin, “Moving Beyond the Hierarchical Approach to Legal Pluralism in the South Pacific” (2009) 
59 Journal of Legal Pluralism 29 and William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory, Butterworths 
2000. 
20 So confirmed the Privy Council in Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286. Also see Case 15 - 
Anonymous (1722) 2 Peer William's Reports 75; 24 ER 646. 
21 The early 1800s were testimony to a tension between retaining “Britishness” and embracing more 
emancipist ideals. A view existed that the adoption of English laws needed to be tempered by the peculiar 
circumstances of the colonies. Notable departures occurred in respect to the right to trial by jury and 
whether convicts could be jurors and the early recognition of male suffrage and even female suffrage. 
22 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 
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These laws had a long pedigree with their origin often subscribed to the 
Magna Carta of 1215. This was effectively a treaty between King John and 
his subjects to the effect that they would be governed according to the law 
and not arbitrarily. Indeed much of the history and evolution of English law 
can be traced to tensions between the English monarchs and their 
subjects. Initially the Monarch was the sole arbitrator on legal matters but 
then as the workload became too great delegates were empowered. 
Appeals to the Monarch were sometimes possible and to ensure fair and 
consistent decisions the doctrine of precedent was created whereby 
previous decisions should be followed unless they could be distinguished 
by their facts. 
The deft hand of religion was never far from the scene so running parallel 
to what became known as the common law courts were the ecclesiastical 
courts with jurisdiction over religious matters, which initially included 
marriage, separation and succession (wills). Then, as the doctrine of 
precedent over time left the common law too rigid and inflexible, a new 
system of courts evolved know as Chancery or Equity. The equitable courts 
were less concerned with common law principles and more with focusing 
on the over-riding fairness of their decisions. Just before Australia’s 
federation the two court systems were merged with the possibility of 
conflicting principles being dealt with by the maxim “equity prevails”.23 
This legal system entertained a feudal system of landholdings. The 
absolute power of the monarchy was reflected in its absolute ownership of 
all the lands of England, the use and enjoyment of which by its subjects 
was permitted at its pleasure. Thus a pyramid system was created with the 
most senior Lords and Barons given vast chunks of land in return for their 
allegiance, with rights to use the land being defused down the pyramid in 
ever decreasing portions to ever decreasing persons of significance. At the 
bottom were the peasants, working parcels of the land in return for paying a 
share of their produce that then made its way back up the pyramid.  
23 Judicature Act 1873 (Imp) 
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By virtue of the Australian Courts Act of 182824 the Privy Council became 
the final court of appeal from Australian courts and all the laws and statutes 
in force in England applied to the Australian colonies.25 Furthermore, the 
doctrine of repugnancy provided that laws passed by a colonial legislature 
where invalid to the extent that they were inconsistent with an English law 
whilst the doctrine of paramount force permitted subsequent English statute 
law to apply to the colonies if it was so worded.26 The effect was to join 
English and Australian common law at the hip and even ensure substantial 
compatibility of statute law. Whilst with federation the Australian 
parliaments were freed up (at least in theory), the courts remained 
constrained for a further 85 years. In 1978 the High Court of Australia 
finally asserted the infallibility of the Privy Council27 and eight years later 
appeals to it were abolished.28 Freed from these shackles it has only been 
in the last 30 years that the Australian common law has carved a divergent 
jurisprudence.29 
So it was that the English system of law and land holding became the 
foundation of the laws in a country of gum trees, kangaroos and, most 
problematically as it was to transpire, aborigines. 
 
Customary law shakes the foundations 
That there could be little room for other than English law in Australia was 
initially a given. The common law is prepared to acknowledge customary 
law but the criteria are strict, namely that the custom:  
• not be inconsistent with any statute or fundamental principle of 
common law,  
• have existed ‘from time immemorial’,  
• have been exercised continuously and peaceably as of right,  
24 Australian Courts Act (Imp) 1828 (9 Geo IV, c 83). Not finally removed until the Statute of Westminster 
1931(Imp), the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (C/W) and the state Australia Acts (Request) 
Acts 1985 and Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985 (C/W). 
25 Although the dates of reception were not consistent across all the Colonies. 
26 Colonial Laws Validity Act (Imp) 1865 
27 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 
28 Australia Act 1986 
29 M. Ellinghaus, A. Bradbrook and A. Duggan (eds.), The Emergence of Australian Law, Butterworths, 
Sydney 1989 at 70. 
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• should be sufficiently certain, and  
• be regarded as ‘reasonable’ by the court.30  
It made sense in the light of the prevailing view that the indigenous 
inhabitants were so primitive as to have no real laws of their own and the 
superiority of the English race meant that the rules of inferior races were 
unacceptable and, typically, barbaric.31 So it was in the Gove land case32 
Blackburn J was able to say, albeit with regret, that the doctrine of 
communal native title was not part of the law of Australia as a settled 
colony. 
But as more enlightened views as to the sophistication of the indigenous 
society began to take hold a realization that the law had been complicit in a 
great wrong began to worry most fair minded Australians. The parliaments 
of Australia responded with land rights legislation but it was the decision of 
the High Court in Mabo33 that became the rally call for the recognition of 
indigenous customary law. Rejecting any idea that Australia was an empty 
land when the British arrived, the Court held that native title could co-exist 
within the land tenure system unless it was specifically extinguished. No 
longer were the lands of Australia to be taken to be absolutely owned by 
the English monarch. 
Reform proposals 
Some years before this decision was handed down the Australian Law 
Reform Commission looked at whether it was desirable to apply customary 
law to aborigines. Whilst the subsequent report acknowledged that 
customary laws were a significant influence in the lives of many aborigines 
a fundamental difficulty was that there was no one authentic version of 
customary law. Rather customary law was a series of dynamic and 
changing systems applying to different groups of indigenous Australians.  
30 Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (ALRC Report 31) available at 
 http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ALRC31.pdf 
31 And hence unreasonable. In Murrell’s case, for example, it was stated that aborigines ‘had no law but 
only lewd practices and irrational superstitions contrary to Divine Law and consistent with the grossest 
darkness.’ Id at paragraph 62. 
32 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 
33 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 
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In particular the report referred to various objections to the recognition of 
customary laws, including: 
• the problem of unacceptable rules and punishments,  
• the secret aspects of customary laws,  
• the need to protect aboriginal women and children,  
• the community divisiveness that recognition could cause,  
• the difficulties of definition, and  
• whether such recognition would violate the principle of equality before 
the law and be racially discriminatory.   
Ultimately the report recommended that aboriginal customary laws should 
be recognised, but within the framework of the general law. Particular areas 
included the recognition of traditional marriages for some purposes, a 
customary law defence in relation to some crimes, the continued 
recognition of customary laws for the purposes of bail and sentencing and 
some hunting, fishing and gathering rights.34 
More recently the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia revisited 
the topic.35 The essence of its 131 recommendations was the recognition of 
customary law on a case by case basis always subject to maintaining 
international human rights standards, with particular attention to the rights 
of women and children and the right not to be subject to cruel punishment. 
Furthermore, customary law was to be taken into account in a number of 
ways with respect to the laying of charges, the hearing of cases,36 
sentencing, bail applications, parole and prison releases to attend funerals, 
34 There were many other recommendations relating to the impact of customs on the interaction of the 
legal system with indigenous people. These included the need for special considerations relating to the 
interrogation and incarceration of aborigines, additional training of police officers and special evidential 
rules as to identifying custom. This later area continues to be a major limitation on the recognition of 
customary laws by the courts: Jennifer Corrin, Report on pleading and proof of indigenous customary law 
in Queensland courts, University of Queensland 2010 available at 
http://www.law.uq.edu.au/documents/cpicl/Pleading-and-Proof-of-Indigenous-Customary-Law.pdf 
(“Corrin”). 
35 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Aboriginal customary laws, The interaction of Western 
Australian law and Aboriginal law and custom, September 2006 available at 
http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/P94_FR.pdf 
36 For example, as to the gender of the judge and/or jury, allowing evidence to be given in narrative form 
(not questions and answers), by a group of individuals or being taken in country, allowing exceptions to 




                                                          
coronial enquiries and post mortems, burial disputes, driving 
disqualification, child custody, succession and maintenance, hunting, 
fishing and gathering rights. Education of both those administering justice, 
as to indigenous culture, and aborigines, as to the law (especially laws at 
odds with custom), was seen as vital.  
The Commission emphasized that it was not recommending a separate set 
of laws for indigenous people but rather seeking to accommodate 
customary laws and practice within the Australian legal system. This was 
termed “functional recognition”: the recognition of customary law for 
particular purposes in defined areas of law. Importantly though it advocated 
some change at the top: constitutional recognition. 
The indigenous courts initiative 
An especially important recommendation was that of the involvement of 
elders and respected people in sentencing. This initiative had, and now 
has, been implemented in most States.37 Whilst the specifics can vary, 
these “indigenous” courts permit not only the involvement of elders in the 
case but display other novel features, such as the sitting of the accused 
unrestrained at the bar table with a supporter, the magistrate and counsel. 
This has given rise to the expression “circle courts”. The informality and 
flexibility, together with the involvement of community justice groups, is 
directed to the judicial officer being able to learn more about the offender 
and the offence and developing an appropriate response. The input of 
elders and respected persons also assists in the offender having a more 
positive attitude towards the process. 
The aim of these courts is, ultimately, to decrease the over-representation 
of indigenous people in the criminal justice system. Whilst there is 
conflicting evidence as to their success38 the real problem might be the lack 
of resources, especially post-court supervision.39  
37 Elena Marchetti and Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Courts and Justice Practices in Australia, Australian 
Institute of Criminology, Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice, Paper No 277, May 2004 
available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/0/8/3/%7B08326CEA-3B11-4759-A25B-
02C1764BCB8A%7Dtandi277.pdf 
38 The Queensland Murri court was closed at the end of 2012 the Government arguing that it was not 
working effectively: Kate Lemmon, “Murri courts axed to save millions”, The Queensland Times (15 
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Apart from statutory initiatives, there are many instances of judges using 
their discretion to take customary laws into account. Such judges tend to be 
“cultural relativists”, a phrase to describe those who take the view that 
moral values operate in the framework of a cultural bias and conduct 
should be viewed in its cultural context.40 Whilst these judges might more 
readily recognize customary laws some would argue that this approach is 
flawed to the extent that it can endorse repressive cultures or socially 
unacceptable behaviour. Thus some indigenous people aggrieved by the 
recognition of these customs have coined the phrase “bullshit law”.41 
Areas were this discretion has often been called into play include in 
applying a reasonable person test, the granting of injunctions to prevent 
coronial autopsies and in family law (especially custody) and succession 
(often burial) disputes.42 Although it has been suggested that customary 
law has largely been marginalized in Australian case law43 the exercise of 
discretion by individual judges has served as a vehicle for its recognition. 
Meanwhile the High Court has expressed the necessity for it to deal with 
the issue when the appropriate matter comes before it.44 
 
  
September 2012) available at http://www.qt.com.au/news/murri-court-is-axed-to-save-35-million-
closure/1545357/ (last visited 12 March 2014). 
39 Anthony Morgan and Erin Louis, Evaluation of the Queensland Murri Court: Final Report Technical and 
Background paper 39, Australian Institute of Criminology 2010 available at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/21-40/tbp039.html (last visited 12 March 2014). 
40 See Franz Boas, Race, Language and Culture, Macmillan, New York, 1948 and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, 
The Dilemma of Context, New York University Press, New York, 1989. 
41 A reference to alleged cultural practices (typically by older indigenous men) to justify physical violence 
or underage carnal knowledge. 
42 See the discussion in Corrin, 34 – 42. 
43 Id, 47. Note that in November 2009, the Australian and State and Territory Governments endorsed the 
National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework which aims to eliminate Indigenous disadvantage in law 
and justice: Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Working Group on Indigenous Justice, National 
Indigenous Law and Justice Framework 2009-2015 (2009).  
44 Elizabeth Byrne, “The World Today – High Court rejects customary law defence in sexual abuse case” 
ABC The World Today, 19 May 2006 available at  
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1642802.htm (last visited 14 March 2014). The particular 
case at issue, involving underage carnal knowledge, was not considered as an appropriate test case 
partly as the principle that ignorance of the law was no defence would deny the accused an argument that 
he was not aware that his reliance on customary rights was not a defence. 
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Shariah  
With the increased migration of Muslims from Islamic nations many 
Western nations are feeling their way in accommodating Islamic beliefs in 
their societies, including their legal systems.45 
Although Australia has a very small Muslim population46 it has not been 
immune from this phenomenon. In fact, the place of Muslims in the 
Australian society is a surprisingly controversial subject for such a multi-
cultural society. Much of the controversy is fueled by conservative elements 
playing up to the fears that exist in the community from terrorist attacks in 
other parts of the world. Nowhere is this controversy more pronounced than 
in the ‘debate’ over whether Australia should accommodate Shariah 
(Islamic law) principles. 
Shariah are the set of principles that regulate the relationship between 
Muslims and God and between themselves. It derives from the principles 
laid down 1400 years ago in the Qur’an, believed to contain the word of 
God transmitted to the Prophet Mohammad, and the Sunnah, rules derived 
from Hadith, essentially the preaching of Mohammad. Together these rules 
are the subject of interpretation and extension by Islamic (legal) scholars 
creating a body of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh. It should be observed from 
the outset that, as with indigenous customary law, there is considerable 
variation in the interpretation and application of Shariah in the Muslim 
world. This is particularly relevant to Australia whose Muslims come from 
80 different nations, with 50 different ethnicities and cultures.47 
 
 
45 Typically with some controversy, for example see the recent uproar in the UK over a Law Society 
practice note for solicitors drafting wills in compliance with Shariah norms: John Bingham, “Islamic law is 
adopted by British legal chiefs”, The Telegraph (22 March 2014) available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10716844/Islamic-law-is-adopted-by-British-legal-chiefs.html 
(last visited 28 March 2014). Further, see the National Secular Society website, an organization dedicated 
to challenging religious privileges: http://www.secularism.org.uk/blog/2014/03/sharia-law-is-well-and-truly-
operating-in-the-uk--thanks-to-the-law-society (last visited 28 March 2014). 
46 350,000 as per the 2006 census: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Census of Population and 
Housing. 
47 On the Australian Muslim community see: Abdullah Saeed, Islam in Australia, Allen and Unwin 2003; 
Abdullah Saeed and Shahram Akbarzadeh (eds), Muslim Communities in Australia, UNSW Press 2001; 
Jamila Hussain, Islam: its Law and Society, Federation Press 2004. 
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In the shadows and out of step 
Notwithstanding this diversity, Australian Muslims live in a legally pluralistic 
environment in a similar way to aboriginal societies. In their daily life they 
must accommodate the official state law of Australia whilst also embracing 
their version of Shariah. For Muslims Shariah is more than law, it embodies 
their religious beliefs and practices. But it is nothing if not pragmatic. There 
is even jurisprudence to guide Muslims as to which laws they are obliged to 
follow when in non-Muslim lands.48 This jurisprudence requires Muslims to 
obey the law of the land in other than matters relating to personal 
obligations, such as rituals, food, drink, clothing, inheritance and, more 
significantly, in matters of marriage and divorce. Much of this recognition of 
Shariah occurs unobtrusively but it is in the context of family law that 
differences in the two systems of law are stark and controversial. For 
example, a 2008 request by two Muslim leaders for the government to 
consider legalizing polygyny49 was met with the stern rebuke from the 
government that this would never happen.50 
Ann Black and Kerrie Sadiq have sought to explain this negative perception 
of Islamic family law that exists in Australia.51 They suggest that family law 
is central to identity and belonging and that Islamic family law is viewed as 
“out of step” with the Australian way of life. Certainly, although the media 
has over dramatically fueled this negative sentiment, there remain some 
fundamental inconsistencies between the two sets of family laws. Under 
Shariah, female initiated divorce must overcome hurdles not applicable to 
men whilst child custody and guardianship also favours the male and is 
premised on with which parent the children will most effectively be brought 
up with Islamic values. Australian law approaches both divorce and custody 
from a no fault no gender distinction and an emphasis (in the case of 
custody) on the best interests of the child and shared parental responsibility 
in which religion plays no part.  
48 Mohamad Abdalla, “Islamic Australia? What place is there for sacred law in a secular land?” (2013) 
21(3) Griffith Law Review. 
49 The practice of a man being able to have more than one wife at a time. 
50 ABC, “No recognition for polygamous marriages: AG”, ABC News, 25 June 2008 available at 
www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/06/25/2285423.htm (last visited 28 March 2014). 
51 Ann Black and Kerrie Sadiq, “Good and bad Sharia: Australia’s mixed response to Islamic Law” (2011) 
34(1) UNSWLJ 383 at 395 – 401. 
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Inconsistencies of this nature have no doubt influenced the government 
rhetoric against embracing Islamic law. In 2008 the then Attorney General 
is quoted as saying that the “government is not considering and will not 
consider the introduction of any part of Sharia law into the Australian legal 
system”.52 The topic was even off the radar of any government enquiry into 
the future shape of Australian multiculturalism. When, in 2011, the 
Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (“AFIC”) lodged a submission 
advocating that “multiculturalism should lead to legal pluralism” the 
suggestion was met with the Minister for Immigration going on the record to 
say: “Anybody who calls for Sharia law is not doing so in the name of 
multiculturalism. They are doing so as extremists and extremists need to be 
dealt with, whatever their creed.”53 Even many in the Australian Muslim 
population reacted against the AFIC’s suggestion.54 
Government hypocrisy on Islamic finance 
Given such emphatic statements of “principle” it is extraordinary that in the 
midst of these statements the same government was promoting Australia 
as an Islamic Finance Centre and commissioning a review into Australian 
law to determine how it might be amended to better accommodate Islamic 
finance.55 Apparently offering Islamic finance products might “foster social 
inclusion” and enable “Australian Muslims to access products that may be 
more consistent with their principles and beliefs.”56 
Islamic finance is a form of finance that accords with Shariah principles, in 
particular the prohibitions on interest, uncertainty and gambling amongst 
52 Barney Zwartz, “Australia’s Muslims cool on change”, The Age (online), 9 February 2008 available at 
www.theage.com.au/news/world/australians-muslims-cool-on-change/2008/02/08/1202234168549.html 
(last visited 28 March 2014). 
53 Sabra Lane, “Multiculturalism is back”, ABC News AM Program, 17 February 2011 available at 
www.abc.net.au/am/content/2011/s3141073.htm (last visited 28 March 2014). 
54 See the discussion by Black (2013) at 72.  
55 See the Board of Taxation website at 
www.taxboard.gov.au/content/content.aspx?doc=reviews_and_consultations/islamic_finance_products/de
fault.htm (last visited 12 March 2014). The inconsistency also extends to the contradiction that halal 
products are regulated. 
56 Nick Sherry (Assistant Treasurer), Opening address to the La Trobe University, National Australia bank 
and Muslim Community Corporation of Australia Symposium on Banking and Finance, Melbourne 6 July 
2009 available at 
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2009/003.htm&pageID=005&min=njsa
&Year&DocType (last visited 12 March 2014). 
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others.57 Although not embraced by all Islamic scholars58 there has been 
an explosion in the popularity of Islamic finance in the Muslim world in the 
last decade or so. The finance industry59 and Australian government has 
identified the economic opportunities for the country from embracing this 
new industry.60 However there are regulatory and, especially, tax law 
barriers that arise from the nature of the transactions that are necessary to 
comply with the Shariah prohibitions. Essentially these transactions recast 
the traditional finance arrangements in a Shariah compliant form which 
avoids the payment or receipt of interest but this can have adverse tax 
implications that render the recast transactions less commercial. The 
essence of the reform proposals is to “supposively” create a level playing 
field for Islamic finance with traditional finance arrangements.61 
Clearly the government’s concern to accommodate Islamic finance 
principles within Australian law is financially motivated for the benefit of the 
country and, as primarily directed at an offshore market, might be 
distinguished from its rejection of embracing Shariah more generally. 
However this rush to embrace Islamic finance has failed to consider the 
many concerns that have been raised by those advocating caution. The 
artificial and complex nature of the transactions, the potential for fraud and 
tax avoidance and the problems of definition, potential lack of parity with 
similar non-Islamic arrangements and the even doubtful Shariah compliant 
credentials of many of these products and their lack of take up amongst 
Muslims are some of the issues.62 Possibly of greater concern given the 
government’s otherwise anti-Shariah rhetoric is the alleged connection 
57 Generally see Justin Dabner, “Eliminating Income Tax Barriers to inbound Islamic Investment” (2008) 
62 Bulletin of International Taxation 238. 
58 Authorities identifying the different viewpoints are referred to in D. Yerushalmi, “Shariah’s ‘black box: 
civil liability and criminal exposure surrounding Shariah compliant finance” [2008] 3 Utah Law Review 
1019 at footnote 59. (“Yerushalmi 2008”) 
59 Australia as a Financial Centre Building on our strengths, Report by the Australian Financial Centre 
Forum, Commonwealth of Australia, November 2009 (“Financial Centre Forum report 2009”). 
60 Islamic Finance, Australian Trade Commission, January 2010 (“Australian Trade Commission 2010”) at 
11. 
61 There is an argument that legitimate Islamic finance arrangements do not generate interest in 
substance or form so are, in fact, taxed appropriately in the absence of special concessions. See  Justin 
Dabner, “Islamic finance in Australia. Interest or not interest that is the question?” (2012) 18 New Zealand 
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 12 (“Dabner 2012”). 
62 The threshold issues that have not been addressed are identified in Dabner 2012. 
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between Islamic finance and terrorist groups and even the suggestion that 
it has the potential to seriously damage the Western finance system.63  
The later may be possibly crackpot views but it is, nevertheless, surprising 
that they have never been investigated by a government apparently 
horrified at the damage that embracing Islamic family law might do to the 
fabric of the country. Australia might never allow polygyny but 
accommodating transactions pursuant to which terrorist groups may be 
funded under the guise of zakat64 is, apparently, less of a concern. 
Although the Australian government’s approach to recognizing Shariah 
may have the hallmarks of hypocrisy, the Islamic finance proposals do 
illustrate how the legal system might allow for some incremental recognition 
of Shariah. Whilst it is less conceivable that a secular country like Australia 
might allow central elements of its legal system to be supplanted by unique 
regimes for exclusive groups, where possible impediments might be 
removed to allow a more inclusionary legal system.65 
Bringing Islamic and other faith based tribunals out of the shadows 
Whether the Australian legal system should defer to Islamic law where 
Muslim parties are concerned, especially in the context of family law, will 
become an increasingly vexed issue as the population of Muslim 
Australians increases. The Islamic finance example may provide a 
precedent. Furthermore, there may, in fact, be an imperative for such 
recognition. As observed above, many Muslims are operating in the 
63 The so called ‘Trojan horse’: see Yerushalmi 2008. The 2008 global financial crisis could partially be 
attributed to Islamic finance, according to some: K. B. Day, “Economic warfare report explains what 
Shariah finance really means” available at 
http://www.theusreport.com/the-us-report/2011/3/1/economic-warfare-report-explains-what-Shariah-
finance-really.html (last visited 28 June 2011). 
64 Levies paid to charities. Such levies might be mandated to excuse, or as a result of, purported Islamic 
finance arrangements that offend Shariah principles. It has been demonstrated that some of the charities 
who are recipients of these payments have connections with designated terrorist organizations: see by D. 
Clarke, “Demystifying Sharia finance in Australia” (29 March 2010) available at 
http://www.islammonitor.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3385&Itemid=85 (last visited 
28 June 2011). Claims that Islamic Finance is funding terrorist activities were rejected by the Michigan 
District Court in the course of dismissing a claim that Federal assistance paid to an entity that promoted 
Islamic finance arrangements violated the secular guarantees in the United States Constitution: see B. 
Gould, “Case against AIG's Islamic finance fails” available at 
http://www.theislamicglobe.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36:case-against-aigs-
islamic-finance-fails&catid=13:article&Itemid=38 (last visited 28 June 2011). 
65 If indeed this is what the proposed Islamic finance amendments would do. 
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shadow of the Australian family law by avoiding State sponsored marriage 
and, largely unknown to the rest of the society, embracing Shariah. But this 
unofficial family law system lacks fundamental protections such as due 
process, legal representation, appellate procedures and decision makers 
who are accountable and whose decisions are transparent.66 The lack of 
international recognition of decisions reached in this unofficial realm also 
has potential to place Australian Muslims returning or travelling to Islamic 
countries in a difficult position. Similarly, the concept of a “limping marriage” 
where a wife has obtained a secular divorce but not one recognized for 
Islamic law purposes is well documented.67 Accommodating Islamic 
marriages within the formal legal environment might not only be a remedy 
but could also provide the means by which adjustments might be 
negotiated to Islamic family law to render it more gender neutral and 
provide greater protection for the rights of children. 
There is precedent for an official pluralistic path, at least in regards to 
Islamic law impacting on personal rights. The UK has its Shariah arbitration 
councils, the decisions of which have been enforceable since 2008,68 
Indian Muslims are governed by The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act 193769 and Singapore has an entrenched Shariah courts 
system dating from 1958 but with its roots as far back as the 1820s.70 
Although the Singapore system, in particular, could be asserted as 
evidence of a model that could be adopted “to help send a message of 
respect and inclusion, counter ethnic and racial tensions and provide a face 
of Islam that is rational and moderate,” Ann Black concludes that it does 
not provide a solution for Australia.71 In her view, Australia’s Muslim 
66 Black and Sadiq at 411. 
67 Family Law Council of Australia, Report on cultural community divorce and the Family Law Act 1975: A 
proposal to clarify the law, August 2001 available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Documents/Cultural%20community%20Div
orce%20and%20the%20Family%20Law%20Act%201975.pdf 
68 See Samia Bano, “Muslim family justice and human rights: the experience of British Muslim women” 
(2007) 1(4) Journal of Comparative Law 1.  
69 Not a separate system of Shariah law but special legislation enforced by the mainstream courts. 
Notably different rules can apply for Shia Muslims than Sunnis. Although the regime dates back to the 
British rule it continues to be controversial with both Muslims and non-Muslims. 
70 Ann Black, “Replicating a ‘Model of Mutual Respect’: could Singapore’s legal pluralism work in 




                                                          
diversity,72 the entrenched cultural preference for secularism over religiosity 
and, most significantly, the constitutional mandate against sectarianism73 
are too greater obstacles.  
The Muslim diversity should not be understated as a road block to any, 
even marginal, recognition of Shariah in Australia. In the absence of a 
dominant Muslim ethnicity there is a divergence in views as to an 
appropriate jurisprudence. In fact, there is evidence that many Muslim 
immigrants are opposed to any form of Shariah having ‘escaped’ from 
oppressive and intolerant regimes.74 In this regard Australia is to be 
contrasted with both Britain75 and Singapore and probably has more in 
common with Canada where Shariah has been comprehensively 
rejected.76 The current unofficial and voluntary realm of Islamic Law in 
Australia at least allows for this diversity of views within the Muslim 
population to be accommodated.77  
Domestic precedents for not establishing formal Shariah courts are 
provided by the Catholic and Jewish examples. The Catholic Church does 
not recognize civil divorce and so divorced Catholics are viewed as sinners 
and may not remarry in a Catholic church or even enter into the 
sacraments.78 In order to avoid these consequences divorced Catholics 
may apply to a church tribunal for an annulment, which may be granted 
where it can be established that the marriage was invalid according to 
72 The Singapore model recognizes indigenous Malays so, if anything, lends support to greater 
recognition of aboriginal customary law in Australia. 
73 S 116 of the Constitution of Australia 
74 Or would be happy with a very few small changes: Abdullah Saeed, “Reflections on the establishment 
of Shari’a Courts in Australia” in Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney (eds), Sharia in the West, Oxford 
University Press 2010, 223 at 231 (“Saeed 2010”). 
75 Where over 75% of Muslims come from the one region of South Asia: Kathleen M Moore, The 
Unfamiliar abode: Islamic Law in the United States and Britain, Oxford University Press 2010 at 17. 
76 At the instigation of Canadian Muslim women: see Homa Arjomand, International campaign against 
Shari’a Court in Canada available at http://www.nosharia.com/eng.htm (last visited 15 April 2014). 
77 Also see the papers by Ann Black: “Accommodating Shariah law in Australia’s legal system. Can we? 
Should we? (2008) 33(4) Alternative Law Journal 214 and “In the shadow of our legal system: Shari’a in 
Australia” in Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney (eds), Shari’a in the West, Oxford University Press 2010 at 
239. In Saeed 2010 the arguments for and against the establishment of Shariah courts in Australia are 
reviewed with the conclusion that the convergence of the two legal systems over time may remove the 
imperative. 
78 See the Catholic Australia website at http://www.catholicaustralia.com.au/page.php?pg=sacraments-
divorcefaqs0 (last visited 18 March 2014). 
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canon law.79 There is no legislative endorsement or legal recognition of 
these bodies and they too operate in the shadow of the official law. 
Similarly, Jewish “courts”, the Beth Din, have been established in Sydney80 
and Melbourne81 since 1905 and 2013 respectively. Again, whilst these 
tribunals have no formal legal recognition they operate in the areas of 
family law and deal with some commercial disputes between Jewish people 
imposing Jewish law (Halakhah). 
But is the mere existence of these other unregulated and unofficial courts 
justification for their continuation? There is certainly an argument that the 
decisions of all these religious tribunals should be recognized at law, with 
the attendant imposition of conditions of voluntariness, transparency, 
accountability and civil processes designed to protect the parties.82 
Furthermore, a right of appeal to the mainstream Australian courts, 
empowered to overturn unfair decisions, would add a further layer of 
protection.  
Furthermore, if the Family Court when considering the grant of a divorce 
was to be able to require the parties to submit to the relevant religious court 
this might overcome the problem of the “limping marriage”. It has been 
suggested that it already has this power in relation to Jewish divorce and it 
should be exercised to ensure that the grant of a civil divorce is effective in 
fact.83 
It is accepted that a potential barrier to such a reconciliation of religious and 
civil laws remains S 116 of the Constitution which provides relevantly that 
the government should not make any law “… for imposing any religious 
observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion…”. It has 
been argued that the referral by a Family Court judge of a matter to the 
79 As to the nature of the Tribunal see: http://www.parra.catholic.org.au/tribunal-of-the-catholic-
church/tribunal-of-the-catholic-church.aspx (last visited 18 March 2014). 
80 See http://elischlange7.wix.com/bethdin3  (last visited 21 March 2014). 
81 See http://www.cosv.org.au/gsqp.php?gsqp=bethdin (last visited 21 March 2014). 
82 Ian Crawshaw, “Courts outside the usual legal processes can offer better outcomes”, 16 June 2011. 
83 Andrew Strum, “Getting a Gett in Australian Courts” available at 
http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/getaus.html  (last visited 21 March 2014) (“Strum”). Also note the 
recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission in its report Multiculturalism and the Law, 
Report No 57, 1992. 
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Beth Din would not breach this section as it is directed at the legislature 
and not the judiciary.84 However, the official recognition of these courts in 
legislation providing for, amongst other requirements, due process and 
appeal rights might breach this provision. 
In the absence of legislative developments the common law, by dent of 
contractual law principles, may still have a role to play in both recognizing 
cultural diversity and providing protection from unacceptable or oppressive 
features of Islamic or other “foreign” laws. This is illustrated by the recent 
decision in Mohamed v Mohamed.85 The case concerned the validity of a 
marriage agreement between parties married under Islamic law but not 
Australian law. At issue was a clause that the husband was to pay the wife 
$50,000 in the event that he initiated separation. In finding that the contract 
was enforceable the Magistrate refused to set it aside on the grounds of 
infringing public policy and specifically acknowledged that the law needed 
to evolve in a manner that accommodated cultural diversity, quoting British 
and Canadian case law86 and the High Court decision in Haque v Haque.87 
The later case was probably even more extraordinary in apparently 
suggesting as far back as 1962 that a polygamous marriage entered into 
within Australia in accordance with Islamic Law should be recognized as a 
valid marriage.88 
A further example is the even older High Court decision in Macqueen v 
Frackelton89 which held that the Presbyterian General Assembly of 
Queensland was not a court in the sense that it took its powers from the 
State but rather could merely arbitrate on the contract that bound members 
of the church. The parties remained able to “appeal” to the civil courts 
notwithstanding a decision of this arbitrator and the courts were bound to 
give effect to the terms of the contract agreed between the members of the 
84 Strum, at 10 – 13. 
85 [2012] NSWSC 852 
86 In particular Nathoo v Nathoo [1996] BCJ No 2720. 
87 [1962] HCA 39; (1962) 108 CLR 230 
88 Note that the Family Law Act 1975 (C/W) s 6 does recognize the validity of Muslim polygynist 
marriages entered into overseas and since 2008 de facto polygamist marriages entered into in Australia 
can be recognized as de facto marriages: s 4AA(5)(b). 
89 (1909) 8 CLR 673 
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church. It followed that if any of these terms were against public policy they 
would not be binding.90 
The ultimate authority of the courts to be able to interfere in the interests of 
public policy may provide aggrieved parties at least some protection.91 
Extending the commercial arbitration legislation 
If any constitutional objections can be overcome and these faith based 
tribunals were to be brought in from the shadows then the extension of 
Australia’s State commercial arbitration legislation to accommodate them 
might provide the appropriate framework. Again this is controversial as 
illustrated by the Ontario experience where the Arbitration Act 1991 was 
sufficiently broadly drafted to permit such tribunals. However, following a 
public outcry concerning Shariah based tribunals, especially over the lack 
of safeguards for the rights of women, the government amended the law to 
prohibit any form of religious arbitration in relation to family matters.92 This 
was notwithstanding a government review which had recommended 
retaining the right to faith based arbitration with additional protections for 
vulnerable parties.93 Some commentators argued that these protections 
simply did not go far enough and were not pragmatic,94 that the notion of 
arbitration was only appropriate for commercial disputes where parties 
90 For a recent decision where an award of the Sydney Beth Din was set aside on the basis of a failure to 
comply with agreed procedure, including giving adequate notice and then reasons for the decision, and 
where bias and impartiality by the decision makers was demonstrated see Thaler v Amzalak (No 2) [2013] 
NSWSC 632. 
91 In the context of the Beth Din also see: Joshua Levi, “Beth Din bias slammed in court”, The Australian 
Jewish News (30 May 2013) available at https://www.jewishnews.net.au/beth-din-bias-slammed-in-
court/30964 (last visited 26 March 2014). 
92 Generally see Anna Korteweg, “The Sharia debate in Ontario” (2006) ISIM Review 50 (“Korteweg 
2006”) available at http://korteweg.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/isim-review_18-501.pdf  and  Mariam 
Pal, “Faith-based arbitration in Canada and Beyond: recent developments and future prospects” 
Presentation to the CBA, Vancouver Branch and to the Institute of Transborder Studies, Kwantlen 
University College Richmond BC, January 24 and 25, 2006 available at http://ebookbrowsee.net/adr-
mspal-presentation-pdf-d185289619. 
93 Marion Boyd, Dispute resolution in family law: protecting choice, promoting inclusion (2004) - executive 
summary available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.pdf 
94 For example, vulnerable parties might be expected to waive their rights to legal recognition and would 
be unlikely to appeal to a civil court, especially if that risks them committing apostasy. Ultimately any 
appeal would substitute the State’s principles of custody, inheritance, etc for that of Shariah or risk 
offending the Constitution and asserting unequal rights amongst the nation’s citizens. 
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were more likely to be able to engage on an equal footing95 and that 
arbitration actually reinforces power imbalances.96 These criticisms all 
failed to address the fact that informal faith based arbitration would 
continue to shape the lives of religious parties and in the absence of any 
attempt of government oversight these people remained vulnerable.97  
The same issues are also surfacing in the UK in relation to its Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunals.98 This has resulted in proposals for legislation 
addressing equality and discrimination issues and jurisdictional creep in the 
proceedings of these tribunals.99 It has been argued though that, whilst 
laudable, legislation alone will not remedy discrimination in the absence of 
social policies that seek to draw the Muslim population into the main 
framework of British society such that Muslims can feel an attachment to 
British laws and values rather than alienated by them.100 
Nevertheless, the arbitration model with jurisdiction extended from 
commercial to personal disputes101 may provide the best answer to the 
question of how the State can ensure that its citizens are free to practice 
their faith and to pursue their consciences whilst also preserving the 
integrity of the public law and maintenance of central democratic 
95 Larry Resnick, “Family dispute arbitration and Sharia law” (2007) available at http://bccla.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/2007-BCCLA-Sharia-law.pdf  
96 Discussed in Korteweg 2006. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See the MAT website at http://www.matribunal.com/ (last visited 21 March 2014). Such bodies are to 




A&bvm=bv.62922401,d.dGI (last visited 21 March 2014)) 
which lack the necessary protections for parties attending before them. On the MAT see Joshua 
Rozenberg, “What can Sharia courts do in Britain?”, The Telegraph (14 September 2008) available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/joshuarozenberg/2957692/What-can-sharia-
courts-do-in-Britain.html (last visited 21 March 2014). 
99 Arbitration and Mediation (Equality) Services Bill [HL] 2013-14. See 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/arbitrationandmediationequalityservices.html (last visited 4 April 
2014). 
100 Rebecca Maret, “Mind the gap: the Equality Bill and Sharia arbitration in the United Kingdom” (2013) 
36 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 255 (“Maret 2015”) available at 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1696&context=iclr  (last visited 4 April 2014) 
101 The UK and initial Ontario arbitration regimes might provide guidance as to an appropriate regime. 
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institutions.102 Such “faith based arbitration tribunals” would provide a basis 
for disputes to be resolved with deference to the parties’ religious 
convictions but they would also be free to have the decision reviewed by a 
civil court with the mandate to reject any decision that breached the general 
laws of the land including fundamental principles of human rights.103 
Matters that might be considered could extend to religious (not civil) 
divorce,104 marriage, inheritance, dowry payments, financial support and 
possibly even custody. 
The difficulties of ensuring protection for vulnerable parties, especially 
women and children, should not be under estimated. There would be a 
particular need to ensure that such parties are not coerced into accepting 
an arbitrator’s decision. Similarly, neither should be underestimated the 
difficulties with reconciling the various Shariah schools with Australian law 
as an Australian Shariah is gradually developed. However the continuation 
of the alternative of allowing faith based law to co-exist in the shadows with 
no protections or oversight fails a vulnerable section of society. 
 
Conclusion 
Although one of the world’s most multicultural societies, old prejudices and 
allegiances remain steadfastly embedded in Australia’s legal system. The 
country has been slow to embrace principles foreign to British common law 
and anglo-centric values. Typically rejected on the basis of the “one law for 
all” mantra, legal pluralism only appears at the margins and in the 
shadows. Whilst we have abandoned assimilation as the guiding principle 
of our migration policy, legal assimilation remains the dominant policy.105 In 
this way we deny those with a particular cultural or religious background 
that might lead to discrimination and social exclusion in a predominantly 
Western environment the sense of solidarity that might come from 
102 Michael Nazir-Ali, “Islamic law, fundamental freedoms, and social cohesion: retrospect and prospect”, 
in Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney (eds), Sharia in the West, Oxford University Press 2010 at 89. 
103 Such a decision might be set aside and returned to the tribunal with directions or, in appropriate cases, 
ruled on directly by the courts. The later approach might require the court ruling on religious law which 
would be problematic: see Uddin v Choudhury [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1205 and the discussion in Maret 
2013. 
104 Civil divorce jurisdiction would remain with the Federal Court alone. 
105 Jamila Hussain, Islam: its Law and Society, Federation Press 2004 
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observing their religious laws and customs. We fail to appreciate their need 
for matters personal to them to be resolved before or amongst those who 
share a similar value system. 
Whilst there have been various law reform recommendations directed at 
integrating or, at least, recognizing some indigenous customs and rites, in 
many respects much is left to the discretion of individual bureaucrats and 
judicial officers. The various guises of indigenous courts are the most 
significant development but in the absence of clear evidence of their 
success their future is not assured in these times of budgetary constraint.  
The difficulty is always as to what extent customs and traditions that are at 
odds with the State’s official laws and international human rights principles 
can have any place in a modern society. If other systems of law, especially 
customary law and Shariah, are to gain a more comprehensive 
representation in Australian society they must overcome the perception, if 
not reality, that they are oppressive of the rights of women and children and 
impose punishments and sanctions at odds with fundamental human 
rights.106 Whilst it might be conceivable that the government or the courts 
might “cherry pick” from the suite of these other laws to accommodate 
some cultural nuances, fundamental principles of justice drawn from the 
embedded system and international treaties will, and should, operate to 
limit what a fair and just society should embrace. It is this author’s belief 
that in the compromise between competing principles the protection of the 
vulnerable should take precedence over cultural nuances and traditions. 
Whilst the practical difficulties are acknowledged, the best way to achieve 
this protection may not be to continue to acquiesce to legal pluralism in the 
shadows but to bring it within the safety net of official recognition with the 
procedures and review rights that entails. It is submitted that the Joint 
Standing Committee on Migration in its 2013 report Inquiry into Migration 
and Multiculturalism in Australia did not appear to appreciate the extent to 
106 See Upendra Baxi, “Discipline, repression and legal pluralism” in Peter Sack and Elizabeth Minchin 
(eds), Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1986. In Refah Partisi (No 2) v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1 the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled that both Shariah and plural religion based legal systems were incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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which de facto legal pluralism exists when it recommended against 
legislative recognition.107 One possible future would be to see these 
religious “courts” recognized as registered arbitrators with ultimate recourse 
to the courts by aggrieved parties. Decisions inconsistent with basic human 
rights and Australian values/laws might then be set aside as against public 
policy. Ultimately this might lead to the creation of Australian versions of 
Shariah, Halakhah and Canon law mirroring the developments in some 
Muslim jurisdictions that are witnessing the absorption of Western legal 
principles into a modified Shariah.108 Such a convergence might 
accommodate the desire of devoutly religious Australians to be able to 
satisfy both secular and religious obligations. 
107 At 85. The report is available at  
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=m
ig/multiculturalism/report.htm (last visited 20 March 2014). 
108 Saeed 2010 
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